Making an Emerging Cage (video) [A Blog Around The Clock]

February 4, 2009 in Blogs, Developing Intelligence by ScienceBlog

From Mimi . Read the comments on this post…

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Making an Emerging Cage (video) [A Blog Around The Clock]

Self-Deception, Over-Confidence and Disposable Men: A Risky Proposition

February 1, 2009 in Blogs, Psychology Today by Psychology Today

In my last post, I brought up the topic of cognitive biases-which are a fancy way of describing our ability to lie to ourselves. Specifically, I was examining the case of quarterback Kurt Warner. Warner displayed a bias known as anchoring-meaning our tendency to make critical decisions based on one lone piece of information (a frequent example of this bias is people who buy used cars after reading the odometer but while ignoring all other sources of information). Warner ‘s anchor was that ‘he was a more accurate quarterback than Brett Farve. Unfortunately, at the time he reached this conclusion, he had no pro starts and only a year of college ball under his belt. Meanwhile Farve was one year away from winning his first Superbowl and his first MVP award. And therein lies the rub. Warner’s anchor was fictive, as was his resulting over-confidence. But this over-confidence served its purpose. Warner’s cognitive bias became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Eventually, Warner become a more accurate passer than Farve (which helps explain why the Arizona Cardinals will today play in the Superbowl). The question I raised but did not answer was how was it that Warner’s bias bore fruit based, as it was, on completely erroneous information. Turns out this is exactly how biases are supposed to work-especially in men. Roy Baumeister has argued that men are more evolutionarily dispensable than women. If you were to cut the world’s male population in half, the only real effect this would have on our species-provided we could overcome our predilections against bigamy- is that those men left alive would end up having even more sex. Cut the world’s population of women in half and the results are a disaster. This shows up in evolution as well. Since men are evolutionarily dispensable, nature has a tendency to experiment more with them. This explains why there are far more male geniuses and male retards than female. It also explains why, historically-and only until the advent of the airplane and the 20th century discovery of the military worth of civilian targets-men went off to fight wars and women stayed at home. This also effects personality. Historically, 80 percent of all women procreate and only 40 percent of all men do. Baumeister contends that the men who get lucky are the ones with greater visibility. Men have to stand out to attract women-which is why they’re built to take risks. In 1988 Daly and Wilson added to this argument when they realized that risk taking both increased men’s access to resources and their access to mating opportunities-which means not only are men built for risk, but it’s also sexually selected character trait. Evolutionary psychologists use this to explain why 83 percent of all arrests for violent crime (and 89.2 percent of all arrests for murder) are men. Cognitive psychologists argue that the urge to take risks needs to be based on something and in many cases this something is the result of our biases. As my fellow blogger and MIT’s Director of the Center for Advanced Hindsight (maybe the best institutional name around) recently pointed out in a conversation: "Realism can be over-rated. And over-confidence can often be a great thing. Look at the information surrounding restaurants. All the data shows that most fail, but entrepreneurs ignore this repeatedly. Their biases are doing exactly what they’re supposed to do-convincing them to bet it all even when they shouldn’t." Warner’s success in football was based on exactly this type of self-deception. And in his case too, that deception paid big dividends. Which is ultimately why we have these biases in the first place-because evolution always bets the long shot.         © 2009 Psychology Today. This RSS Feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this material in your news aggregator, the site you are looking at is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact blogs@psychologytoday.com so we can take legal action immediately.

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Self-Deception, Over-Confidence and Disposable Men: A Risky Proposition

Rats, Children, and the Need to Play: an Apology for the Modern Children’s Museum

February 1, 2009 in Blogs, Psychology Today by Psychology Today

It’s bloody cold where I live. In the interminable cycle of snow and sub-freezing ambience, I have two daughters whose brains, literally, crave movement. But before we talk about that, let’s talk about rats with toys and rats without. In fact, let’s put rats off for a moment too. Let’s talk about Children’s Museums. That’ll take us to rats and their toys, and move us nicely then to the welfare of the brains of our children. The story goes like this: Anyone who has been a kid and now has one knows that children’s museums have been changing. What began often as tired wings of the more-adult institutions now have their own buildings and names (the Boston Children’s Museum, for example), and their own stuff. Parents often view these younger establishments with a mixture of dread and relief. Turn your kid loose! Every display cries out for this kind of freedom. But wait. Where the hell is my kid? And who is that ill-behaved little imp who just elbowed that sweet curly haired toddler in the kidney, and where are his parents, and would someone please tell me in this age of drug resistant bacteria why anyone designed a place where children could crawl all over each other and leave trails of snot the way a snail marks his progress across the sidewalk. I still to some extent see Children’s Museums as one giant petri dish, a happy place for viruses, bacteria, and a select few multi-cellular microbes to party. The humans are the ecosystem, the paradise for which these winter-time bugs long. And yet every weekend, tired parents and their wheezing progeny line up before the museum opens, push their way in through the doors like they’re going to see the Who in concert, and provide new and exciting homes for the mass of germs that lay in wait, like trap-door spiders, for the first little hand to move them to some new organic material. The circle of life is like this. Recently at our local Children’s Museum I set my children free. I unleashed them from the sweaters and coats and mittens and scarves that stilted their youthful and impossible movements, my daughter unraveling from her parka like a mummy eager to leave the darkness of his tomb, and off she went, climbing the fantastical web-like structure that is the center piece of the Boston Children’s Museum. Kids disappeared and reappeared 10 feet above, elbowing, clawing, climbing and moving. They were like ants with no purpose except to move from one stage to the next. And, undeniably, they were ecstatically happy. I found myself marveling that they volunteered for this. Even more, they crave it, more than I crave my morning coffee. And, as a guy who likes to think about brains, I also had to remind myself of the incredible process to which I was now being treated. I was watching little brains become big ones. I was watching, in vivo, neurogenesis. So, now, let’s talk about rats. For years, rats have had the misfortune of being laboratory animals with brains just big enough to be studied. In college, I lived in a co-op with a woman who practiced Wicca. She had sprung a rat from the school biology lab and carried him around on her shoulders. He was named after an African god whose title escapes me, but I still remember that white wonderful beast, clinging to his mistress’s hair and collarbone, and running down her left arm to eat at the table with the rest of us at dinner. He looked at us thoughtfully, with every suggestion that he enjoyed his thoughts, and he grasped his little piece of bread in his hands not unlike a toddler, nibbling wisely with his mouth open. This was not a dumb animal. His friends, though, faced worse fates. A charitable narrative for his cousins involved life in the animal behavior labs rather than the medical research ones. This would mean an endless and increasingly complex array of mazes to negotiate, and then, as befits the noble fate of many lab animals, the insensitive and blunt probing into how his brain changes after mastering the maze itself. Unfortunately, this often involved a high tech blender, which to this day creates conflicts for me, but that is the subject of another blog. Here’s what was discovered, and keep in mind that this is hardly surprising and therefore not the punch-line of the story. Rats that spend their days in mazes have bigger and more robust brains than rats that sit around in sterile laboratory cages and eat and sleep all day. They especially enjoy neuronal growth in the frontal lobes, the executive regions of the brain, the places they go to biologically when it is time to solve problems. Makes sense, doesn’t it? If you spend all day solving puzzles, you’re brain is likely to grow to accommodate the changing environment. That’s what neuroplasticity is all about. But, what if it isn’t the maze that causes their brains to grow? And what if the optimal time for growth is limited. It turns out that older rats that run mazes don’t learn as quickly, and their brains are less likely to morph for the better. This jives with what we know about brain injuries in general. Younger patients recover function more quickly, their childish brains more willing and able to bend from their original tasks. So, here is the punch-line: The maze matters, but not nearly as much as the running around itself. Free form play, the exploration of novel stimuli, the equivalent of recess at a grade school without rules (in the laboratory setting this means a cage with cool stuff to climb on) correlates with the most neuronal growth of all. It ain’t the maze. It’s the act of playing, non-directive playing, that makes the difference. It’s the damn germ laden web-like climbing structure in the Boston Children’s Museum that makes our kids happiest, and, more importantly, that makes our kids brains grow like dandelions in a June front lawn. The Boston Children’s Museum’s web-like climbing structure is way cool…and our kids crave way cool. You can almost see their little dendrites and axons talking. So, let’s wrap up by considering the rest of the life of a child. In fact, this story could be all about policy. My daughter goes to a wonderful school where recess if preserved. There are cool things to climb on, monkey bars to master (she broke her wrist on the monkey bars while demonstrating her simian prowess to her friends), and slides to race down and around. Rules are generated by the children and for the children, and we know from the rats that this is what makes their brains happy. Increasingly, however, we stifle recess, organize activities, schedule play, and mandate fun. We take the rats out of the cage with cool stuff and put them back in the boring mazes. It’s better than the cages where they can only eat and sleep, but not by much. The social forces that propel such intensely organized activities have been much discussed, but think for a moment. How incredible, and how sad, that we have not worked harder to preserve the deceptively simple and optimal setting for the brains of our children. The science is there to support the loosening of the reigns. Let’s hope that the policy follows. © 2009 Psychology Today. This RSS Feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this material in your news aggregator, the site you are looking at is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact blogs@psychologytoday.com so we can take legal action immediately.

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Rats, Children, and the Need to Play: an Apology for the Modern Children’s Museum

Complete Genomics to release sequencing data on Thursday [Genetic Future]

February 1, 2009 in Blogs, Developing Intelligence by ScienceBlog

Complete Genomics is a DNA sequencing company that launched back in October , and has been creating a buzz in the genomics community ever since. The company’s business model is based around a novel technology for rapidly generating DNA sequence data; but rather than make its money by selling its platform to genomics facilities and biotech companies (as do its competitors, such as Illumina and ABI), Complete will be offering its technology only through its own purpose-built service facilities. The buzz has focused on whether Complete’s technology will be accurate and powerful enough to meet the company’s stated goal of offering a $5,000 whole human genome sequence by mid-2009, let alone its far more ambitious long-term goals : [Complete Genomics] is now building the world’s largest commercial human-genome-sequencing center. It expects to sequence 200 genomes per day by the end of 2010, he says. Over the next five years, the company plans to build 10 more centers with a goal of sequencing 1 million complete human genomes. It’s been hard to judge how close the company is to making these lofty dreams a reality, because it has kept any data about the performance of its platform a secret. That will change on Thursday: the company has announced that it will be releasing its sequencing data publicly for the first time at the AGBT meeting this week . I’ll be attending , so I’m looking forward to seeing whether the data meet with the high expectations that Complete Genomics has been generating. Subscribe to Genetic Future . Read the comments on this post…

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Complete Genomics to release sequencing data on Thursday [Genetic Future]

OBSESSION: A HISTORY: The author strikes back

January 29, 2009 in Blogs, Psychology Today by Psychology Today

I’ve been generally happy with the reviews of my new book Obsession: A History but a recent one requires a response. Dag Agins’s in The Huffington Post . writes that when someone tries to cross the line between science and the humanities, that person ends up pleasing neither side of the divide. He particularly criticized my effort to show a continuity between obsession in the culture at large and obsession in a person. Agins tells us that we must never blur the clinical with the cultural and he ratifies the idea that diagnoses have to be somewhat rigid to clearly demarcate the pathology from the sociology. Yet, he ends up making contradictory remarks about diagnoses, saying that they are just labels and strategies, but then asserts that they are necessary. I want to respond to his objections. There has for too long been the feeling that only people "in" the sciences can critique the sciences. This is a strange point to make since science prides itself on being an unbiased search for truth with all parties allowed to make inquiries and subject results to strict oversight. The objection that only scientists are allowed to criticize scientists is therefore a violation of the claim to objective truth. In fact, the role of the humanities is not simply to provide novels and poetry for doctors to read, but to teach and explore the use of language, the logic of an argument, and necessary grounds for rhetorical persuasion. No one disputes that the data are the data, but interpretation always intervenes between data collection and scientific conclusions. So we need to look at Agins language and reasoning itself: "…psychiatric categories are merely labels for clusters of symptoms, but it’s also true that psychiatric categories of some kind are absolutely necessary in the clinic as a guide for what sort of behavior to expect from a patient. A psychiatric label is simply a practical device to assist in treatment." The summarization of his own data here isn’t even logical. If diagnoses are "merely labels for clusters of symptoms," or "practical devices", then how can they be "necessary" in any scientific or rigorous way? If we said that "electrons" or "super novas" are only labels or devices, we would no longer be in the realm of science. If we are to examine such a cluster of symptoms as if it were a real thing, as we might in analyzing the neurochemistry or brain structure of people with OCD, then shouldn’t we have a stronger sense that a diagnosis described a real thing rather than a cluster of symptoms? Agins goes on to explain that although there isn’t very good science now to explain what OCD is or how it works, nevertheless "people who are distressed by psychiatric symptoms do want and need treatment" and therefore "diagnostics and treatment must be constrained by pragmatism, by what seems to work." So in the end, Agins is saying in effect, "OK, we don’t know what causes OCD or how the brain works in this disorder, but we have to do something since people come to us for help, and so we are forced to invent diagnoses that aren’t proven by any rigorous system so that we can try treatments that ‘seem’ to work." But the reality in OCD is that not only is there no diagnostic rigor but there are poor outcomes for patients who face a lifelong battle with the disorder. The best controlled statistics show that a third of patients get better, a third get worse, and a third remain the same. Anecdotal evidence is much more enthusiastic on the part of practitioners, as one would assume it would be with many websites for clinics claiming, without any controlled evidence, that their success rates are close to 70 per cent. Is that science? Just because clincians are in the trenches doesn’t mean they have the clearest view of what they do. Sometimes an educated observer from outside the specific profession can fly over the battlefield and get a better sense of the lay of the land. In fact, scientists are very good at one thing, detailing the increasingly narrow and specific mechanisms they study. What science isn’t very good at, and where it needs people from the humanities-historians and sociologists of science, is in articulating the big picture and making logical claims about the implications of their particular discoveries. Don’t be fooled when a scientist tells you to keep out of his backyard. It’s not done in the interest of science. It’s done to protect the backyard. © 2009 Psychology Today. This RSS Feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this material in your news aggregator, the site you are looking at is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact blogs@psychologytoday.com so we can take legal action immediately.

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OBSESSION: A HISTORY: The author strikes back

Feeling Risky Today? How’s Your Dopamine? [Neurotopia]

January 28, 2009 in Blogs, Brain & Behaviour by BrainAndBehaviour

It’s that time of the semester again. The time when Sci has to present at her Journal Club. I know I’ve talked about Journal Club a couple of times, but what is the purpose of a Journal Club? For those not in grad school, what IS a Journal Club? For my MRU, Journal Club is a small-sized class, usually held weekly, wherein students take turns presenting a paper they find awesome. The class then (theoretically) holds a good discussion based on the paper. I say (theoretically) because grad students are often tired, excessively overworked, and usually don’t have time to read the paper beforehand. So the discussion is not always stimulating. But for the best papers it usually is. So what is the purpose of people presenting papers to each other? Well, in grad school you get a lot of experience in a lot of things. Things like learning new methodologies, trying new techniques, time management, tearing your hair out, and alcoholism. You get training in how to analyze and interpret your data, and how to write that data up for publication. In some programs, you even get experience in how to write your first grant. But there are a couple of things the typical grad student in biomed will not have a lot of experience in: 1) Presenting hefty science. Those of us in biomed do not TA classes to fill our plates and pay our rent (though some of us, like Sci, do anyway). In some programs, it is possible to go an entire year without ever presenting your data to an audience other than your cat. Usually committee meetings are required, and sometimes public seminars, but often not. And so a grad student can emerge from the chrysalis of PhD a TERRIBLE presenter if they are not careful. 2) Telling a good paper from a bad one. In a perfect world, all grad students would be able to tell good papers from bad without a problem. Their lab and mentor would guide them through with a gentle hand. Often, however, this is not the case, and you’ll show what you thought was a good paper to your advisor, only to be greeted with “Are you kidding!?! That guy’s a crackhead!” In both of these scenarios, Journal Club is there for you. You get experience presenting a paper full of hefty science, and it’s up to you to present what you know to be the best new research in the field. In the small class, there won’t be too many people to laugh at you, and you’re more likely to get constructive feedback on why the paper was or was not good, what they could have done better, and what they probably ARE doing now for their next publication. So Journal Club is useful, and it is up to Scicurious to therefore present some good science. Science that is well thought out, elegant, and may even be presented with a little bow on the top. And that is why I’m asking you all for your input! I want to know not only that I will pick a good paper, but also that I can present it in a way that is clear. With that in mind, let’s get started on the first of the three possible offerings which I can sacrifice on the alter of my Journal Club: St. Onge and Floresco. “Dopaminergic modulation of risk-based decision making”. Neuropsychopharmacology, 2009, 34, 681-697. Read the rest of this post… | Read the comments on this post…

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Feeling Risky Today? How’s Your Dopamine? [Neurotopia]

Anger Problems in the Fog of Dogma

January 27, 2009 in Blogs, Psychology Today by Psychology Today

I want to apologize in advance for this post, which is really an esoteric debate between therapists. Yet I urge present and potential consumers of psychotherapy to skim it, along with Dr. Diamond’s cited post, to appreciate the importance of doing your own research on the ideology of any psychotherapist you might hire. Most therapists have websites that, with careful perusal, indicate whether they rely on dogma or research. You can also ask them directly whether they do objective follow-up evaluation of their work. To escape the blind spots inherent in all our professional ideologies, therapists must be able to frame hypotheses drawn from those ideologies in empirical terms and, whenever possible, test those hypotheses with real-world data. Otherwise we merely derive assumptions from other assumptions of the ideology, which reduces it to the status of dogma, i.e., there is no way to know it is true apart from our faith in it. A few of the fundamental scientific questions for psychotherapy are: "What are the sources of the data on which the therapist bases hypotheses, how valid and reliable are those sources, and how do you know that your ideological blind spots are not influencing your observations and interpretations of the data. These fundamental questions bring us to the major reasons why it is not the therapist’s job to tell clients whether their anger is "appropriate." First of all, the term, "appropriate" is a social construction, contextually-dependent and embedded with personal and cultural biases. More important, if the therapist does not objectively test hypotheses, he interprets data through the blurred lens of his own ideologically-biased assessments of the client. (To put it in terms Dr. Diamond prefers, how can the therapist ever really know that he is not projecting?) Still more important, the descriptions of their experience that angry clients make in the artificial environment of psychotherapy are inaccurate , as demonstrated by the empirical evidence of substantial cognitive and memory impairment that occurs during anger arousal. To the extent that their accounts even approach accuracy, they are woefully incomplete , omitting all other perspectives and mitigating information. Just as therapists can suffer confirmation bias in regard to their ideologies, angry clients suffer acute confirmation bias when it comes to their anger – because they feel like victims, they process only confirming evidence, ignoring all disconfirming evidence. Angry clients can easily sound like they are married to Norman Bates’ mother – they’re just minding their own business when she hacks at them with a kitchen knife. Videotapes of anger occurring in real-world interactions show that it differs greatly from the way people describe it after the fact. (More on the relevance of real-world interactions later.) In short, the therapist has no way of knowing whether the client’s description of his anger in real life is contextually "appropriate." The crucial point here is that the therapist doesn’t just validate the client’s anger but also the construction of reality that makes the client feel like a victim. In other words, the grandiosity of the therapist who doesn’t test hypotheses validates the narcissism of the client. To be sure, everyone is narcissistic when angry. In the adrenalin rush of even low-grade anger, everyone feels entitled and more important than those who have stimulated their anger. Everyone has a false sense of confidence (if not arrogance), is motivated to manipulate, and is incapable of empathy, while angry. The therapist can hardly validate the sensations of anger without also validating (at least in the client’s mind) the distorted construction of reality associated with the sensations, as well as the motivation for retaliation that go with anger arousal. Evidence Dr. Diamond agreed in his original response to my post that there has been a worrisome increase in anger and violence in recent decades. He attributes it to the suppression and repression of anger. He cannot support that hypothesis with mere ideological iterations; rather, he needs to present objective evidence that suppression and repression of anger are on the increase or at least that there was an outbreak of infantile suppression of anger 20 years ago. (Something in the water supply got into breast milk?") If he can establish that, he then has to explain why reasonable people should suppose that increased suppression/repression has caused the increase in anger, rather than facts like children viewing 11,000 murders on TV before the age of 14, wide-spread media glorification of anger-displays, and other potent effects of modeling demonstrated in the social psychology research literature. If Dr. Diamond really believes that we have more anger now because we more often shame people for experiencing anger, he needs to count the number of angry displays by "heroes" highlighted in the news and entertainment media. Our heroes freely display a righteous, passionate anger, while the villains are passionless psychopaths. The all too familiar stereotype of masculinity, very much a product of cultural conditioning, proscribes only one emotion for men, and that is anger – any softer emotion is unmanly . In contrast, women are permitted to express all emotions except anger, which is oppressively deemed unfeminine. So if the hypothesis that attaching shame to anger causes pathological anger is to be supported, women would have show a lot more of it and, subsequently be acting out more pathologically than men. Of course, the empirical literature shows the opposite. To merit credibility, Dr. Diamond’s hypothesis that "narcissistic wounds" cause problem anger, like the suppression/repression hypothesis, would have to account for the observed increases in anger. Are we to believe that parents started wounding their children more two decades ago, when the steam engine theory of emotions and that infamous psychodynamic derivative – blaming parents – was well established in the vernacular? Of course, the heaviest blow to the "childhood wounds" hypothesis is the empirical finding that most abused children grow up to be fairly good parents, no angrier than anyone else. Emotions are not Steam Engines Dr. Diamond is correct in noting that the 19th Century steam engine view of emotions was, indeed revolutionary and widely accepted by therapists for quite a while, but it was never accepted by scientists. A revolution also occurred in medicine around the same time, yet Dr. Diamond would not expect his personal physicians to use 19th Century methods and techniques in their treatment of him. Therapy clients have the right to similar expectations of their therapists. As I understand Dr. Diamond’s rendition of the steam engine theory, "appropriate" anger should be experienced and expressed – but not acted on , as the retaliation motive of all anger would risk turning "appropriate" feelings into inappropriate behavior; in other words, it’s good to feel but not do . He also seems to think that suppressed/repressed "appropriate" anger, like egg salad, eventually turns rotten when stored somewhere in the body, where it "festers" and causes inappropriate anger. Functional MRIs show what happens when a person experiences anger – within or without conscious awareness – but, alas, do not show where or how it builds up and festers. We can measure other kinds of invisible festering by things like white blood cell counts and depleted immune system functioning. If there were such a thing as festering anger, it would show up in elevated rates of cortisol in the saliva. I know of no such empirical confirmation of the fester hypothesis. I’m curious to learn how, apart from dogma, Dr. Diamond knows that suppressed appropriate anger festers, indeed, knows it with enough certainty to risk the iatrogenic effects of validating the anger of angry clients. Certainly the empirical literature – as opposed to those early 20th Century case studies embedded in dogma – indicates that there is no lasting therapeutic benefit of catharsis and that anger expression worsens anger problems. Neurological evidence vs. conceptual descriptions Dr. Diamond’s term, "pathological anger," is a conceptual description. (At least it is more precise than "appropriate," which piles personal and cultural prejudices on top of conceptual blind spots.) Neither "pathological" nor "appropriate anger" has neurological meaning; it makes no sense neurologically to distinguish between pathological and appropriate anger. Habituation, an observable phenomenon, occurs through repetition; hence the expression of "appropriate" anger has the same habituation effects as the expression of inappropriate anger. Expression of anger doesn’t let off steam or get anything out of your system; it gives you a temporary amphetamine ride that reinforces the synaptic association of vulnerability with anger arousal, entitlement, and motives for retaliation. This bears repeating: through habituation effects, the expression of anger is conditioned to occur in response to gut level feelings of vulnerability that are not subject to higher and much slower cognitive judgments about the presumed childhood source of the vulnerability. When it comes to regulating anger, inferences about Mom or other remote "sources" of anger will be too little too late. Viable psychic theories must account for neurological evidence, not merely dismiss it as "another way of looking at the same thing." In fact, anger is not nearly so complicated and difficult an emotion as Dr. Diamond suggests. It is a simple response to perceived vulnerability in the face of perceived threat. Some authors have developed convoluted ways of thinking about anger and hyperbolic ways of describing it (e.g., "existential integrity"), but those merely justify or cover up the empirical shortcomings of their ideologies. Notably, none of the convoluted ways of thinking about anger predict anything verifiable about the phenomenology of an emotion that is observed and measurable in all animals, emanating from a region of the brain common to all animals. Real-world interactions In the fog of trying to distinguish "appropriate" from inappropriate anger in the consulting room, Dr. Diamond misses the real-world significance of emotional interaction. One law of emotional interaction is negative reactivity , which can be understood in this way. If you approach a person – or an animal – with anger (appropriate or not), what percentage of the time can you expect a negative response? Another law relevant to aggressive emotions is feed-back escalation . Anger is not for ties – you do not want to hurt the saber tooth tiger as much as it hurt you; you want to destroy its capacity to hurt you. People (and animals) who receive anger cues do not match them but top them, which is why anger escalates so quickly in real-life interactions. The angry person interprets other people’s negative reactions to his anger as unfair and deserving of retaliation, which prompts a like response in the other. There are two naturally occurring antidotes to the reactivity and escalation effects of anger in human and animal interactions: fear and shame. Fortunately for other animals, these important emotions still serve that healthy function. But we humans have developed a fear/shame phobia – most of the time we choose the temporary power of anger over the transitory powerlessness of fear and shame. (That is why, in the course of an ordinary day you will witness far more displays of low grade anger, resentment, agitation, and irritability than fear and shame.) Thus fear/shame phobia is implicated in the observed increase of anger, along with empirically supported hypotheses about social modeling and social conditioning, the high contagion of aggressive emotions, and a growing sense of entitlement that makes us think we have the "right" to feel good most of the time and to manipulate and control other people, a la "My ‘existential integrity’ is superior to yours." In contrast, the "suppression/repression" hypothesis offered as scientific explanation of the increase in anger, seem "reductionist," embarrassingly univariate, and impoverished by failure to account for the remarkable adaptability of human and animal central nervous systems. Ethics Dr. Diamond inadvertently highlights an important ethical issue in his comment: "It is typically in reflecting on such angry outbursts retrospectively (my emphasis) in treatment that inappropriate anger–and often the fear, guilt and shame about it–are recognized." In other words, someone has to get hurt to create a window of opportunity for Dr. Diamond’s insight about "appropriate" vs. inappropriate anger. My experience with many clients whose previous therapists subscribed to the steam engine school of anger suggests that a lot more hurt than Dr. Diamond imagines occurs between his sessions. Although he is right about "acknowledging that anger is present in the consulting room," it is quite another matter to encourage its expression and to validate it. The client will have more compelling motivation in the heat of real-world interactions to use expert validation to justify his anger, than to recall whatever insight about Mom-transference the therapist may have pointed out earlier in the week. I believe it is an ethical imperative when working with angry people to objectively evaluate the effectiveness of your work, not just through the unreliable self-report of the client, but from reports of those who live with him, both during treatment and for a good year after termination. Reducing the Need for Anger In daily living, humans have little need of primary anger – that stimulated by threat of harm to self and loved ones. The vast majority of the anger we experience is in response to rather petty ego offense, hyperbole about existential integrity and "the individual’s most basic right to being an individual" notwithstanding. In the vast majority of anger experience, we feel devalued in some way and blame it on someone else, which creates an illusion of threat, which, in turn, stimulates anger. Here, too, therapeutic focus on the appropriateness of the anger or its presumed roots in childhood tragically misses the point. Anger in response to feeling devalued substitutes a temporary feeling of power for value – you don’t feel more valuable when angry, you simply feel more powerful, as long as the amphetamine effect lasts, after which you crash. Therapy is about teaching clients to raise their self-value when they feel devalued in the real world. (Ultimately, the only way they can sustain true self-value in our highly socialized world is to become more compassionate.) They don’t need to know whether some therapist thinks their substitution of power for value is "appropriate." Rather, their attention must focus on whether their anger is helping them be the kind of person, parent, and intimate partner they most want to be. The focus of therapy is on helping them achieve those ends, not in reinforcing their unfortunate association of perceived vulnerability with anger by pronouncing it "appropriate." Of course no one should feel ashamed for feeling angry, and I doubt that many people do. But we all feel shame for violating our values. Most people violate their values when they perceive others, particularly loved ones, as menacing characters who are nothing other than whatever ego threat they seem to pose at the moment of anger. But the shame is not punishment for the anger; it is motivation to be true to one’s deepest values, i.e., to see others not as a source of emotion but as complex, separate people, independent of emotional reactions to them. When we follow that motivation, there is no need to express or manage anger; it simply becomes unnecessary for protection. I sincerely hope that Dr. Diamond can transcend dogma and present verifiable evidence for his views on anger, which, so far, seem far more literary than scientific. If he does come up with something verifiable, we can have a meaningful debate. © 2009 Psychology Today. This RSS Feed is for personal non-commercial use only. If you are not reading this material in your news aggregator, the site you are looking at is guilty of copyright infringement. Please contact blogs@psychologytoday.com so we can take legal action immediately.

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Anger Problems in the Fog of Dogma

Squeezing the genome: how to shrink your whole-genome sequence to 4 MB [Genetic Future]

January 16, 2009 in Blogs, Developing Intelligence by ScienceBlog

A new paper in Bioinformatics describes an efficient compression algorithm that allows an individual’s complete genome sequence to be compressed down to a vanishingly small amount of data – just 4 megabytes (MB). The paper takes a similar approach to the process I described in a post back in June last year (sheesh, if only I’d thought to write that up as a paper instead!). I estimated using that approach that the genome could be shrunk down to just 20 MB – compared to about 1.5 GB if you stored the entire sequence as a flat text file – with even further compression if you took advantage of databases of genetic variation like dbSNP . The basis of this compression is the use of a universal reference sequence . Each individual will differ at only a minority of sites (about 0.1%) from this reference, so you can save huge amounts of space simply by not storing the vast majority of the bases where their sequence is the same , and instead just creating a compressed list of the differences. The authors of this paper add some further refinements to this approach that I hadn’t considered, such as taking advantage of the repetitive nature of the human genome to further compress the sequence of insertions (i.e. areas of the genome that are present in the individual but not in the reference sequence). It’s worth noting, however, that the benefit of this tactic will erode over time as the reference sequence becomes steadily more complete, and eventually becomes a montage containing all of the unique sequence found in common insertion variants in the population as a whole. (Then most variations will be deletions relative to the reference rather than insertions, and deletions take up a lot less data.) While all this is very impressive, making such a heroic effort to compress the genome is probably a little excessive given how rapidly digital storage space is growing. From a personal genome point of view, most of us already carry gigabytes of digital storage on our person most of the time, so shrinking sequences down to 4 MB (which comes at the cost of adding to the time required to access the data in that sequence) is probably unnecessary – less stringent compression would probably be fine in most cases. However, I suppose that extreme compression may be useful for organisations that intend to archive extremely large numbers of complete genome sequences (assuming that sequencing costs continue to drop faster than digital storage costs). And of course there’s the whole issue of the need to store sequence quality data. The system in the article works fine for a complete, perfectly accurate genome sequence, but right now no sequencing platform is capable of generating such a sequence – far from it, in fact. It’s likely that for the foreseeable future personal genome sequences will contain a mixture of both high- and low-quality sequence, and it will thus be useful to keep them attached to information on the confidence of each called base. That will add at least somewhat to the size of the storage space required. Still, I imagine this paper was designed as more of an intellectual than a practical exercise. I look forward to the inevitable Netflix Prize -style arms race as competing genome enthusiasts struggle to squeeze out even more extraneous kilobytes over the next few years. Subscribe to Genetic Future . S. Christley, Y. Lu, C. Li, X. Xie (2008). Human genomes as email attachments Bioinformatics, 25 (2), 274-275 DOI: 10.1093/bioinformatics/btn582 Read the comments on this post…

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Squeezing the genome: how to shrink your whole-genome sequence to 4 MB [Genetic Future]

A Very Famous Little Zebroid [Living the Scientific Life (Scientist, Interrupted)]

January 16, 2009 in Blogs, Developing Intelligence by ScienceBlog

tags: zebroid , zorse , hebra , zebra-horse hybrid , streaming video Here’s some video of an individual zebroid (zebra-horse hybrid) that I wrote about in July 2007 [0:48] Read the rest of this post… | Read the comments on this post…

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A Very Famous Little Zebroid [Living the Scientific Life (Scientist, Interrupted)]

Einstein was smart, but Could He Play the Violin? – the winner of the synchroblogging contest [A Blog Around The Clock]

December 20, 2008 in Blogs, Brain & Behaviour by BrainAndBehaviour

Happy Anniversary, PLoS ONE! Today is PLoS ONE’s second anniversary and we’re celebrating by announcing that the winner of the second PLoS synchroblogging competition is SciCurious of the Neurotopia 2.0 blog. “This fluent post captures the essence of the research and accurately communicates it in a style that resonates with both the scientific and lay community” – Liz Allen, PLoS. Here is the winning entry, cross posted in its entirety: ==================== Einstein was smart, but Could He Play the Violin? I already wrote one entry for PLoS ONE’s second birthday, but I’m feeling sparky today, and I think I like this paper better. I don’t know about you guys, but when I was a sprog, my parents dragged me to music lessons. LOTS of music lessons. As of right now, I have been producing music of some type for the past 21 years straight. And I LOVE it. Of course, I didn’t always love it. I remember my mother dragging me and my brother to lessons, making us sit down every day and practice (I was, and still am, no good with the practicing), and the fear and shakiness of recitals (heck, I still get that, and it’s been 21 years). In her time, Sci has actually “mastered” (it’s a debatable point), three different instruments (‘instruments’ is a loose term), and still uses one of them professionally on occasion. And if you can guess what they are, Sci will…do something cool. Like send you one of her favorite books. Or perhaps a tshirt with a molecule on it. Or perhaps some of her delicious cookies. Obviously, you can only guess if you don’t KNOW already (that means you, Dad). So there you go, contest open. Anyway, years and years of music lessons. But the question is: did they do me any good? Does playing ‘Baby Mozart’ really do anything, and is anything achieved by starting your child on Suzuki when they are 2, other than the pain and misery of your child, and possibly an eventual love of music? Can it, perhaps, make me SMARTER? Forgeard et al. ” Practicing a musical instrument in childhood is associated with enhanced verbal ability and nonverbal reasoning ” PLoS ONE, 2008. And for the record, Einstein did play the violin. Apparently he was quite good. There actually are several studies out there that show that techniques that you learn can “transfer” to other techniques, giving you a bit of an edge. This works best when you’re performing skills that are very similar to each other (like learning how to estimate the area of a square, and then learning how to estimate the area of a triangle). We know this happens for musicians in the development of fine motor skills. Once you’ve been playing the violin for a while, other things that require fine motor skills will come to you a bit easier (perhaps we should train all would-be surgeons on musical instruments, if you can master playing Rachmaninoff, brain surgery should be a piece of cake). Of course, most of the studies that have been done are correlational in nature. Kids who play musical instruments have better motor skills. This could be due to the music, or the kids could play music because they have good motor skills. Good motor skills could be a development of things like the higher socio-economic class that often goes along with being taught music as a child, and thus parents are maybe able to put more effort to their development. The possibilities go on. Correlation is NOT causation. The same thing goes for the correlation between musical learning and IQ. There was a modest correlation, but it could be just the effect of the extra lessons the kids were receiving, resulting in more time spent on focused attention and mastering a skill. Significant correlations have also been shown for music and verbal and language skills. Music lessons have been found to be correlated with increases in reading ability and phonetic comprehension. This actually leads me to a question: if language, reading, and phonetic comprehension are related to the pitch and tone of words, do children who are tone deaf have a harder time mastering reading and verbal skills? I think this might warrant a future PubMed search. Unfortunately, all the previous tests tended to focus on the “transfer” of skills to not very related fields, like IQ. So in this study, the authors wanted to look at the effects of music learning on “near” transfers, skill closely related to music training: spatial reasoning, verbal abilities, nonverbal, and mathematical. They also looked for VERY closely related skills: fine motor control and auditory skill. They grabbed a whole bunch of kids around 8-11 years old. Some played musical instruments, some didn’t (one of the problems with this study to me is that the control group is a good bit small than the instrumental group, 41 musicians vs 18 non). Kids were controlled for the socio-economic class of the parents. Average length of music training was close to five years. They also divided the kids up by whether or not they got Suzuki training, but ended up grouping them together, as Suzuki effects were no different from other instrumentalists. Dang, they didn’t graph their data. Well, I shall fix. Because I can. People should be so grateful I do all their graphing… There you go. So, as you can see from the graph (the pretty, pretty graph), musical kids scored a lot better on fine motor skills for left and right hand (the first two sets of bars). This is pretty expected, if you’re using fine motor skills a lot, presumably you’ll get better at them. The musical kids also did better when distinguishing tones and following melody lines, though interestingly, they didn’t show any improvements in rhythm. I wonder if this has anything to do with the kids of music the kids were studying. There wasn’t a single drummer in the bunch, it was all either piano or stringed instruments. And finally, the kids with musical training scored a lot better (I know it doesn’t look like it, but the MANCOVA analysis uncovered a difference) on vocabulary testing. They outperformed their non-musical counterparts in both verbal ability (vocabulary) and non-verbal reasoning skills. They didn’t find any differences in math or spatial reasoning. The authors hypothesize that music training may transfer skills to some other related domains. The other hypothesis is that music training doesn’t enhance a specific skill set, but rather your general intellectual ability. This would mean they would score higher on every test given. In fact, they DID score higher, but most of the time the scores didn’t reach significance. Still, remember this is correlation, not causation. Families were of similar socio-ecoomic class and education, but that doesn’t mean they are all similar parents. Kids who take music lessons may have parents that are more involved in their intellectual development. Kids that persist in taking music lessons for a good chunk of time may have superior motivation. Correlation =/= causation. But it’s still a cool paper, and no matter what, it’s quite clear that music lessons didn’t HURT. Time to tape your poor child to the piano bench! Marie Forgeard, Ellen Winner, Andrea Norton, Gottfried Schlaug (2008). Practicing a Musical Instrument in Childhood is Associated with Enhanced Verbal Ability and Nonverbal Reasoning PLoS ONE, 3 (10) DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0003566 Read the comments on this post…

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Einstein was smart, but Could He Play the Violin? – the winner of the synchroblogging contest [A Blog Around The Clock]